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COMMENTS
The Bildisco Dilemma

I.

INTRODUCTION

Throughout American history, the concept of free enterprise has
remained sacred, and Americans have sought to maintain a national environment in which private business can thrive. One means
of accomplishing this has been to afford legal protection to businesses experiencing financial difficulties amounting to bankruptcy.
Such businesses have the opportunity to preserve their enterprise
through a Chapter 11' reorganization, rather than to see it destroyed by bankruptcy. Pursuant to a Chapter 11 reorganization,
a bankrupt business may continue to operate under court
supervision 2 while devising a plan to pay creditors3 whose demands
have been temporarily frozen. 4 Also, certain contracts categorized

1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1982) and Supp. IV (1986). An alternative to
Chapter 11 is Chapter 7, 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1982) and Supp. IV (1986). Chapter
7 provides for the liquidation of a bankrupt business so that creditors may be paid.
Where a bankrupt business cannot meet both the costs of liquidation or reorganization proceedings and the claims of creditors, a distribution of assets must occur.
This distribution of assets is based upon a priority scheme established in 11 U.S.C.
§§ 506-507. Ehrenwerth and Lally-Green, The New Bankruptcy Procedures For
Rejection of Collective-Bargaining Agreements: Is The Pendulum Swinging Back?,
23 DUQ. L. REV. 939, 942 (1985).
2. Ehrenwerth and Lally-Green, supra note 1, at 941.
3. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1121-1129.
4. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). Section 362(a) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under
section 301, 302, or 303 of this title ...operates as a stay, applicable to all
entities, of(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the
commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against
the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this
title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate,
of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under
this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property
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as executory5 may be permanently rejected 6 in an effort to expedite
the reorganizational recovery.
Another premise which has, in the course of American history,
come to be sacred, is the idea that the labor force is entitled to
certain rights. These rights have evolved from many years of struggle
and include the ability of labor to organize and bargain collectively.
To ensure that management does not try to usurp these rights and
that labor does not exploit them, the National Labor Relations Act
(the "NLRA") 7 was passed. Under the NLRA, abuses of these rights
by either labor or management are designated unfair labor practices.'
Included among these unfair labor practices is a unilateral failure to
honor a contract formed through collective bargaining. 9 Under the

from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of
the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor
any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before
the commencement of the case under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that
arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title against any claim against the
debtor; and
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United
States Tax Court concerning the debtor.
5. An "executory contract" has been defined as one "on which performance
remains due to some extent on both sides." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 347 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6303; S.
REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5787, 5844.
6. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982). Section 365(a) provides:
Except as provided in sections 765 and 766 of this title and in subsections
(b), (c), and (d) of this section, the trustee, subject to the court's approval,
may assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor.
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
8. Id. § 158.
9. Id. § 158(d). Section 158 (d) provides in pertinent part:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of
the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees
to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a
written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either
party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal
or require the making of a concession: Provided, That where there is in effect
a collective bargaining contract covering employees in an industry affecting
commerce, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no party to
such contract shall terminate or modify such contract, unless the party desiring
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NLRA,10 a collectively bargained contract cannot be altered or discarded unless both parties participate in, and approve of, the rejection. I"
The American system may seek to foster both the survival of a
bankrupt private enterprise and the protection of the rights of labor,
including enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. A collision
between these two policies could, however, force a choice between
them. Such a collision could hypothetically arise if a bankrupt
business, reorganizing under Chapter 11, categorized a collective
bargaining agreement as an executory contract and rejected it. The
union Which negotiated the agreement would likely argue that such
a unilateral rejection constituted an unfair labor practice. At the
same time, the business would likely argue that its recovery from
bankruptcy depended on rejection of the labor contract. This hypothetical collision actually occurred in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 2
where a choice between these two competing policies was forced.
II.

NLRB v. BILDISCO & BILDISCO

Bildisco & Bildisco ("Bildisco"), a New Jersey general partnership,
had negotiated a three-year collective bargaining agreement with its
employees' union. 3 Bildisco's failure to meet some of its obligations

such termination or modification(1) serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract of the
proposed termination or modification sixty days prior to the expiration date
thereof, or in the event such contract contains no expiration date, sixty days
prior to the time it is proposed to make such termination or modification;
(2) offers to meet and confer with the other party for the purpose of
negotiating a new contract or a contract containing the proposed modifications;
(3) notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service within thirty
days after such notice of the existence of a dispute, and simultaneously
therewith notifies any State or Territorial agency established to mediate and
conciliate disputes within the State or Territory where the dispute occurred,
provided no agreement has been reached by that time; and
(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lockout, all the terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty
days after such notice is given or until the expiration date of such contract,
whichever occurs later. (emphasis added).
10. Id. §§ 151-169.
11. Id. § 158(d). See supra note 9.
12. 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
13. Id. at 517-18. The union referred to, Local 408 of the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America,
represented 40 to 45 percent of Bildisco's workers. Id.
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under the collective bargaining agreement began in January of 1980.14
On April 14, 1980, with approximately two years of the agreement
remaining, Bildisco voluntarily filed a Chapter 1115 bankruptcy petition. The Bankruptcy Court then designated Bildisco a "debtor in
possession"'' 6 and authorized continued operation of its building
supplies distribution business. 17 In May of 1980, Bildisco again deviated from the collective bargaining agreement by refusing to pay
18
called-for wage increases.
This series of events culminated in the union filing unfair labor
practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"),
which responded by issuing a complaint in July of 1980.19 The NLRB
ultimately determined that Bildisco had violated the National Labor
Relations Act. 20 Bildisco's unilateral change of the collective bargaining agreement's terms and its refusal to negotiate with the union

were named as the sources of the violation. 21 Sections 8(a)(1)2 2 and
8(a)(5) 23 were the specific sections of the National Labor Relations

14. Id. at 518. Obligations which Bildisco did not meet included payment of
health and pension benefits as well as remittance to the Union of dues collected
under the agreement. Id.
15. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174.
16. 11 U.S.C. § 1101 (1982) defines debtor in possession as follows:
(1) "debtor in possession" means debtor except when a person that has
qualified under section 322 of this title is serving as trustee in the case.
11 U.S.C. § 1107 describes the duties of a debtor in possession as follows:
(a) Subject to any limitations on a trustee serving in a case under this
chapter, and to such limitations or conditions as the court prescribes, a debtor
in possession shall have all the rights, other than the right to compensation
under section 330 of this title, and powers, and shall perform all the functions
and duties, except the duties specified in sections 1106(a)(2), (3), and (4) of
this title, of a trustee serving in a case under this chapter.
17. 465 U.S. at 517.
18. Id. at 518.
19. Id. at 518-19. Specifically, the unilateral changes which the NLRB condemned were Bildisco's failure to pay certain fringe benefits and wage increases
mandated in the agreement, as well as its failure to remit dues to the union. Id.
20. Id. at 519.
21. Id.
22. Section 8(a)(l) of the National Labor Relations Act is found at 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(1) (1982) and provides as follows:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title.
23. Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act is found at 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(5) (1982) and provides as follows:
(a)It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title.
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Act deemed-to have been violated. 24 The NLRB, after ordering
Bildisco to comply with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, 25 petitioned the Third Circuit Court of Appeals for enforcement
26
of its order.
A few months later, in December of 1980, Bildisco sought permission from the Bankruptcy Court to reject the collective bargaining
agreement.27 At the hearing, one of Bildisco's general partners testified that rejection of the agreement would save his company approximately $100,000.2

In January of 1981, the Bankruptcy Court

granted Bildisco the requested permission, allowing the union thirty
days to file a claim for damages from the rejection of the collective
bargaining agreement. 29 The district court upheld the Bankruptcy
Court.3 0 The Third Circuit then consolidated the union's appeal with
the NLRB's petition to enforce its order requiring Bildisco to adhere
to the collective bargaining agreement.3"
On the issue of Bildisco's ability to reject the agreement, the Third
Circuit categorized a collective bargaining agreement as an executory
contract.3 2 As such, the court held the agreement subject to rejection
under section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.3 The Third Circuit
further held that Bildisco, as a debtor in possession, constituted a
new and separate business from the pre-bankruptcy Bildisco.3 4 This
classification freed Bildisco from adherence to the modification guidelines of section 8(d) of the NLRA.35 The court reasoned that the
post-bankruptcy Bildisco, as a separate entity, was not party to the
pre-bankruptcy agreement and was thus not bound to uphold it.36

24.

465 U.S. at 519.

25.

Id. Specifically, the NLRB ordered Bildisco to make the pension, health,

and welfare payments required under the collective bargaining agreement, as well
as to remit the union dues as required. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 518. Permission for rejection was sought under 11 U.S.C. § 365(a).
See supra note 6 for the full provision.
28. 465 U.S. at 518. The union presented no witnesses of its own at this
hearing. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 519. (This Third Circuit decision is reported as In re Bildisco, 682
F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1982)).

32.
33.
34.
35.

465 U.S. at 519.
Id. See supra note 6 for the full provision of § 365(a).
465 U.S. at 520.
Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act is found at 29 U.S.C.

§ 158(d). See supra note 9 for the pertinent parts of this provision.

36.

465 U.S. at 519-20.
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The court proceeded to qualify its holding, noting that the law favors
collective bargaining agreements.3 7 This favored treatment, the Third
Circuit stated, places an additional burden on a debtor in possession.3"
A debtor in possession must show that rejection is the most equitable
solution and that the agreement constitutes a financial burden.3 9
On the issue of the NLRB's order upholding the collective bargaining agreement, the Third Circuit declined enforcement of the
order/h In so holding, the court rejected the NLRB's conclusion that
Bildisco, as a debtor in possession, was an "alter ego" of the prebankruptcy Bildisco. 4 l The Third Circuit repeated that Bildisco, the
debtor in possession, was a new and separate business not bound by
42
the collective bargaining agreement of the pre-bankruptcy Bildisco.
Furthermore, the court held that allowing Bildisco to reject the
agreement under Chapter 1143 precluded the finding of an unfair
labor practice for failure to adhere to the section 8(d)" modification
guidelines .41
Following the Third Circuit decision, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari. 46 Two related questions were presented on
appeal to the United States Supreme Court:
(1) under what conditions can a Bankruptcy Court permit a debtor in
possession to reject a collective bargaining agreement;
(2) may the National Labor Relations Board find a debtor in possession
guilty of an unfair labor practice for unilaterally terminating or modifying a collective bargaining agreement before rejection of that agreement has been approved by the Bankruptcy Court. 47
37. Id. at 520.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 520-521. This standard, which the Third Circuit borrowed from
Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Products, Inc., 519 F.2d 698 (2d
Cir. 1975), is a variation from the traditional test used for obtaining rejection. That
traditional test is the "business judgment rule." 465 U.S. at 521. (See infra note 63
for explanation of the business judgment rule.) After adopting this standard, the
Third Circuit remanded the case to the Bankruptcy Court for reconsideration. 465
U.S. at 521.
40. 465 U.S. at 521.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174.
44. Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act is found at 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(d) (1982). See supra note 9 for the pertinent parts of this provision.
45. 465 U.S. at 521. The Third Circuit went on to imply that the converse
is also true. That is, the NLRB could find a § 8(d) violation if the Bankruptcy
Court found that the collective bargaining agreement could not properly be rejected.
Id.
46. Id.
47. 465 U.S. at 516.
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In response to the first question, the Court decided that a
collective bargaining agreement may be categorized as an executory
49
contract 48 rejectable under section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.
The Supreme Court went on to state that "an appropriate showing"
is needed before the Bankruptcy Court may approve the rejection. 0
In response to the second question, the Court held that an unfair
labor practice does not occur when a collective bargaining agreement
is unilaterally modified after the filing of a bankruptcy petition, but
The United
before a court-approved rejection of the agreement."
5 2
Circuit.
Third
the
affirmed
Court
States Supreme
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, began by determining
when a debtor in possession may reject a collective bargaining agreement.5 3 The analysis commenced by establishing that a collective
bargaining agreement is properly categorized as an executory contract
under section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. 4 Justice Rehnquist
reasoned that the underlying purpose of section 365(a), 5 as well as
the express language of the Bankruptcy Code's section 116756 allow
a collective bargaining agreement to be classified as an executory
contract which is subject to rejection. 7 In support of this contention,
Justice Rehnquist first maintained that the designated purpose of
section 365(a) is to limit the debtor in possession's power to reject
executory contracts; yet, none of the limitations in section 365 apply
to collective bargaining agreements." Secondly, Justice Rehnquist
noted that the language of section 116719 expressly exempts contracts
falling under the Railway Labor Act6° from section 365(a) rejection.

48.

Id.

49. For the full provision, see supra note 6.
50. 465 U.S. at 516.
51. Id. at 516-17.
52. Id. at 517.
53. Chief Justice Burger and Justices O'Connor, Powell, and Stevens joined
in Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion.
54. See supra note 6 for the full provision.
55. Id.
56. 11 U.S.C. § 1167 provides:
Notwithstanding section 365 of this title, neither the court nor the trustee may
change the wages or working conditions of employees of the debtor established by
a collective bargaining agreement that is subject to the Railway Labor Act (45
U.S.C. § 151 et. seq.) except in accordance with section 6 of such Act (45 U.S.C.
§ 156).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See supra note 6 for the express language of this provision.
60. 465 U.S. at 522. The Railway Labor Act is found at 45 U.S.C. § 151
et. seq. (1982).
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This express exemption demonstrates Congress' recognition of its
ability to create such exemptions. 61 Thus, the absence of an exemption
for collective bargaining agreements implies a conscious choice to
subject these agreements to section 365(a) rejection. 62 Justice Rehnquist went on to assure that a stringent standard would be applied
so that rejection of collective bargaining agreements would not be
63

freely allowed.
The Court's next task was to define this more stringent standard
and to determine its parameters. The union and the NLRB argued
for the standard established in Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and
Steamship Clerks v. REA Express, Inc., 64 permitting rejection of an
agreement only where reorganization would fail in its absence. 65 The
problem with the REA Express standard was that the case was
decided three years prior to Congress' enactment of section 365(a). 66
The debate thus became whether Congress had been cognizant of the
REA Express standard and had intended its incorporation into section
365(a). 67 Ultimately, the majority decided that the REA Express
standard was "fundamentally at odds with the policies of flexibility
and equity built into Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code," and thus
68
could not be adopted.
Justice Rehnquist described the standard which the majority did
69
adopt as higher than that employed for other executory contracts,

61. 465 U.S. at 522-23.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 524. The Court reasoned here that a stricter standard is needed
because of the special nature of collective bargaining agreements. Id. The traditional
standard employed to determine rejection of executory contracts is the "business
judgment rule." This rule allows abandonment of a contract which is "burdensome"
to the debtor in possession, such that its rejection will create a "net financial
benefit". Matter of Minges, 602 F.2d 38, 42-43 (2d Cir. 1979). (citations omitted).
64. 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1974), ° cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975).
65. 465 U.S. at 524.
66. Id. The REA Express case was decided in 1975, and 11 U.S.C. § 365
became law in 1978.
67. Id. Incorporation of the REA Express standard into § 365(a) would be
supported by the canon of statutory interpretation which presumes Congress' awareness of judicial interpretation of statutes. The NLRB, adopting this canon, argued
that Congress should be presumed to have incorporated the REA Express standard

into § 365(a).
68. Id. at 525. The majority reasoned that under the REA Express standard,
the entire matter would be reduced to one concern: whether liquidation would be
prevented by allowing rejection of the contract. The Court found this standard to
be so overly stringent and inflexible that it is nearly impossible to meet. Id.
69. The standard employed for other executory contracts is the "business
judgment rule." See supra note 63 for an explanation of this rule.
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but less stringent than the REA Express standard. 70 This intermediary
7
standard, carried forward from the Third Circuit decision below, '
allows rejection where it can be shown that rejection is the most
equitable solution and that the agreement constitutes a financial
burden. 72 Furthermore, attempts to voluntarily negotiate a modification of the agreement must have first occurred and have been met
with a lack of speed and success which impedes the reorganization
process. 73 The majority opinion then noted that the aim of Chapter
11 is to facilitate the rehabilitation of debtors. 74 Thus, a determination
must be made that this aim would be promoted through rejection of
the contract. 75 Justice Rehnquist concluded the majority's treatment
of the first question by reminding that a Bankruptcy Court is a court
of equity and must, therefore, balance the involved equities while
also adhering to the aims of Chapter 11.76
The Supreme Court majority then turned to the second question
presented: whether unilateral rejection of. a collective bargaining
agreement prior to Bankruptcy Court approval constitutes an unfair
labor practice by a debtor in possession. 77 Analysis of this issue
commenced by asking whether the relationship of the post-bankruptcy
debtor in possession to the pre-bankruptcy debtor was that of an
"alter ego" or a "successor employer'. 78 The majority found neither
of these classifications appropriate. 79 Instead, the majority described
the debtor in possession as the same pre-bankruptcy "entity" which

70.

465 U.S. at 526.
71. In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1982). Here, the Court also acknowledged another case which adopted an identical standard to that of the Third Circuit
decision: In re Brada Miller Freight Systems, Inc., 702 F.2d 890 (lth Cir. 1983).
72. 465 U.S. at 525-26. See supra note 39 and accompanying text discussing
the Third Circuit's decision.
73. 465 U.S. at 525. The Court based this requirement on the dictates of the
National Labor Relations Act. Section 8(a)(5) (found at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)-see
supra note 23, for the full provision), imposes a duty on employers to bargain
collectively. Section 8(a)(1) (found at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l)-see supra note 22 for
the full provision), advocates a national policy of avoiding labor strife and encouraging collective bargaining. To promote this policy, § 8(a)(1) requires unions and
employers to reach their own agreements where possible, without interference from
the government. 465 U.S. at 526.
74. 465 U.S. at 527.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 528. (citations omitted).
79. Id. In rejecting these two classifications, the majority made the following
comment: "We see no profit in an exhaustive effort to identify which, if either, of.
these terms represents the closest analogy to the debtor in possession." Id.
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was now permitted to function under the authority of the Bankruptcy
Code. 0 The majority asserted that only when allowed to operate
under this authority and, therefore, able to reject executory contracts,
could a debtor in possession be free of those burdens which would
deter successful reorganization.'
The union and the NLRB both recognized that the ability to reject
executory contracts is necessary to successful reorganization.12 Still,
the union and the NLRB persisted in arguing that the rejection of a
collective bargaining agreement constitutes an unfair labor practice
when it occurs after the filing of a bankruptcy petition but before
approval by the Bankruptcy Court. 3 Justice Rehnquist countered
that acceptance of this argument would run contrary to Chapter
Il's 4 goal of flexibility. 5
Justice Rehnquist further refuted the argument of the union and
the NLRB by determining that during the time in between the filing
of the bankruptcy petition and acceptance or rejection of a collective bargaining agreement, the agreement does not constitute an
enforceable contract under section 8(d) of the National Labor
Relations Act.8 6 In support of this position, Justice Rehnquist
argued that to hold otherwise would run contrary to the explicit
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 7 Specifically, section 365(g)(1) 8

80.

Id.

81.

Id.

82. Id.
83. Id. at 529-30. The union and the NLRB argued that the unfair labor
practice would occur pursuant to §§ 8(a)(5) and 8(d) of the National Labor Relations
Act. Id. See supra notes 23 and 9, respectively, for the pertinent parts of these
provisions.

84.

11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174.

85. 465 U.S. at 529. Rehnquist reasoned that Chapter 11 allows a debtor in
possession up until the time when a reorganization plan is confirmed to decide
whether or not to reject a contract. Chapter 7, on the other hand, allows only a
60 day period from the order of relief, in which to decide whether or not to reject
a contract. To allow rejection under Chapter 11 to only occur pursuant to Bankruptcy
Court-approval would, according to Rehnquist, blur the distinction between Chapter
7 and Chapter 11 proceedings and thus contravene the purpose of Congress in
allowing two separate types of proceedings. Id. For more on Chapter 7, see supra
note 1.
86. 465 U.S. at 532. See supra note 9 for the pertinent provisions of § 8(d).
The majority opinion cited two cases in support of the proposition that the agreement
is not enforceable during this interim period: Chemical Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502

(1962).
87.

465 U.S. at 532. The majority also asserted that to hold to the contrary
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provides that rejection of an executory contract relates back to the
day immediately prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 9
The effect of this relation back is that damages on the contract
which flow from the rejection must go through bankruptcy proceedings and be subject to the priority scheme to which other
creditors are subject. 90 Thus, the effect is that the collective bargaining agreement "is no longer immediately enforceable, and may
never be enforceable again." 9' The relevance of this is that in
seeking to prohibit rejection in the period immediately following
the filing of the petition, the union and the NLRB claim to be
enforcing section 8(d). 92 In actuality, however, the result would be
to enforce the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. 93 The
majority found this to be an unacceptable result because of the
reduced importance to which the collective bargaining agreement
is rendered by the relation back theory and the resulting priority
scheme it triggers.

94

The majority then dismissed the next argument presented and
further discredited the applicability of section 8(d) to the instant
case. The union, but not the NLRB, argued that the debtor in
possession is bound by the midterm contract modification guidelines
of the section 8(d). 95 In refuting this argument, the majority concluded
that compliance with the section 8(d) guidelines prior to Bankruptcy
Court-approval is obviated because the collective bargaining agree96
ment does not constitute an enforceable contract under section 8(d).
This conclusion was based on the rationale that modification under
these circumstances results from operation of law (Chapter 11), rather

would violate the implicit purpose of the code: to provide "flexibility and breathing

space" to debtors in possession. Id.
88. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(1) provides:
(g) Except as provided in subsections (h)(2) and (i)(2) of this section, the

.rejection of an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor constitutes
a breach of such contract or lease(1) if such contract lease has not been assumed under this section or
under a plan confirmed under chapter 9, 11, or 13 of this title,
immediately before the date of the filing of this petition ....

89.
90.
91.

465 U.S. at 530.
Id. at 531.
Id. at 532.

92.

Id. See supra note 9 for the pertinent part of § 8(d).

93.
94.
95.
96.

465 U.S. at 532.
Id.
Id. See supra note 9 for the pertinent parts of § 8(d).
Id.
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than from unilateral action by the employer, so that section 8(d) is
necessarily circumvented. 91
As an alternative to the previous argument, the union contended
that even if section 8(d) was inapplicable, the debtor in possession
should still be bound to "bargain to impasse" with Court-sanctioned
rejection serving as a last resort. 98 The majority dismissed this argument by concluding that the inapplicability of section 8(d) subordinates the duty to bargain to the dictates of the Bankruptcy Code,
thus excluding any obligation to bargain to impasse. 99 Furthermore,
whether or not bargaining to impasse has occurred was deemed a
determination for the NLRB.100 To ask the Bankruptcy Court to
make such a determination, Justice Rehnquist wrote, would create a
diversion from the court's primary area of responsibility and force
a decision in an area outside of its expertise.' 0'
The majority of the Supreme Court went on to express its support
for the policies of the National Labor Relations Act. °u The majority
noted that, despite its declaration of bankruptcy, a debtor in possession still constitutes an employer under the National Labor Relations Act. 03 As such, the debtor in possession is bound to adhere to
the Act's guidelines in the bargaining of the new contract to succeed
the rejected one.104 Finally, the judgment of the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals was affirmed. 05
Justice Brennan wrote a separate opinion, concurring in part and
dissenting in part.' ° The point of divergence for the Supreme Court's
minority was the second issue of the case: whether an unfair labor
practice occurs through the altering of a collective bargaining agreement after the filing of the bankruptcy petition but before the
Bankruptcy Court approves rejection. 07 Justice Brennan asserted that

97. Id. The majority also added that Chapter 11 renders the contract unenforceable such that, in essence, the union was advocating application of § 8(d) to
an already unenforceable contract. Id. at 533.
98. Id. The majority opinion here noted that its interpretation of this argument by the union was that rejection should be pursued only when further negotiations would be of no avail such that the duty to bargain is excused. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 534.
101. Id.
102. Id. The majority described this policy as the protection of "the process
of labor negotiations." Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 535. Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun joined in this opinidn.
107. Id.
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such an occurrence does constitute an unfair labor practice.10
III.

LABOR REACTS TO BILDISCO

Reactions to the Supreme Court's decision in Bildisco were frequently sympathetic to labor.'09 A newspaper headline announcing
that "Unions Lose as High Court Backs Companies In Bankruptcy
Filings" typified this sentiment." 0 Among unions, concern grew that
financially stable companies might file Chapter 11 bankruptcy as a
means of escaping unattractive labor contracts."' At least one commentator argued that the unions' concern was unfounded. 1 2 In
support of this position, some undesirable results of filing Chapter
11 bankruptcy were enumerated." 3 It was argued that these undesirable results could outweigh any benefits and serve as deterrents to
l 4
bad faith filings of bankruptcy."
One such deterrent could be the possibility of court appointment
of a trustee or examiner." 5 The likelihood of such an appointment

108. Id.
109. Ehrenwerth and Lally-Green, supra note 1, at 940.
110. Id. See New York Times, February 23, 1984, at 1. This same newspaper
article went on to characterize the Bildisco decision as "a sharp setback for organized
labor." Id.
111. Note, Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements Before and After
the 1984 Code Amendments, 68 MARQ. L. REV. 351, 362-63 (1985).
112. White, The Bildisco Case and the Congressional Response, 30 WAYNE L.
REv. 1169 (1984).
113. Id. at 1186.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1187. 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (1982) allows for appointment of trustees
and examiners, and provides in pertinent part the following:
(a) At any time after the commencement of the case but before confirmation
of a plan, on request of a party in interest, and after notice and a hearing,
the court shall order the appointment of a trustee(1) for cause, including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement of the affairs of the debtor by current management, either
before or after the commencement of the case, or similar cause, but not
including the number of holders of securities of the debtor or the
amount of assets or liabilities of the debtor; or
(2) if such appointment is in the interests of creditors, any equity security
holders, and other interests of the estate, without regard to the number
of holders of securities of the debtor or the amount of assets or liabilities
of the debtor.
(b) If the court does not order the appointment of a trustee under this section,
then at any time before the confirmation of a plan, on request of a party in
interest, and after notice and a hearing, the court shall order the appointment
of an examiner to conduct such an investigation of the debtor as is appropriate,
including an investigation of any allegations of fraud, dishonesty, incompet-
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could be increased by the presence of angry employees alleging "gross
mismanagement." "6 The undesirability of trustee-appointment rests
in the fact that a trustee prevails over all other management, including
the board of directors and even the chief executive officer. 1 7 Although vested with less power than a trustee," 8 an examiner may be
equally unwelcome in his function as an investigator of alleged foul
play by management. 1 9
The impact on shareholders and creditors might be another unwelcome result of filing bankruptcy. 2 0 A Chapter 11 petition freezes
Creditors, including banks, brokerage
all pre-bankruptcy debts.'
firms, trade creditors, and holders of debt instruments may, there-

fore, have to wait an unknown amount of time to collect owed
principal. 22 Furthermore, interest accruing between the filing of the
petition and finalization of the reorganization plan is not calculated
at the contract rate, if it is even paid at all. 123 Dividend payments

ence, misconduct, mismanagement, or irregularity in the management of the
affairs of the debtor of or by current or former management of the debtor,
if(1) such appointment is in the interests of creditors, any equity security
holders, and other interests of the estate; or
(2) the debtor's fixed, liquidated, unsecured debts, other than debts for
goods, services, or taxes, or owing to an insider, exceed $5,000,000.
116. White, supra note 112, at 1187. The specific provision providing for
trustee appointment pursuant to allegations of "gross mismanagement" are contained
at 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(l). See supra note 115 for the full provision.
117. White, supra note 112, at 1187.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1187-88. Alleged foul play which may be investigated by an
examiner includes "fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, misconduct, mismanagement,
or irregularity in the management of affairs of the debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 1104(b)
(1982). See supra note 115 for the full provision.
120. White, supra note 112, at 1188.
121. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). See supra note 4 for the full provision.
122. Id.
123. Id. This proposition results from 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(b)(2) and 507(b)
(1982).
In relevant part, 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) provides:
(b) Except as provided in subsections (f), (g), (h) and. (i) of this section, if
such objection to a claim is made, the court, after notice and a hearing, shall
determine the amount of such claim as of the date of the filing of the petition,
and shall allow such claim in such amount, except to the extent that(2) such claim is for unmatured interest.
In relevant part, 11 U.S.C. § 507(b) provides:
(b) If the trustee, under section 362, 363, or 364 of this title, provides adequate
protection of the interest of a holder of a claim secured by a lien on property
of the debtor and if, notwithstanding such protection, such creditor has a
claim allowable under subsection (a)(1) of this section arising from the stay
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due shareholders are considered discretionary and as such are given
even less priority than the claims of creditors.1 24 In sum, the impact
of Chapter 11 on creditors and shareholders is that it "successfully
antagonizes" those with "the most intense interest in the corporation's success." 125 This is a result which many companies would avoid
at any cost, including toleration of an unattractive collective bargaining agreement.
IV.

CONGRESS RESPONDS TO BMDISCO: SECTION 1113 BECOMES LAW

While the deterrent effects of filing a Chapter 11 petition may
have helped to allay some of labor's fears, these fears were perhaps
better combated by Congress' response. Congressional response followed quickly on the heels of the Bildisco decision and resulted in
amendment of the Bankruptcy Code. 12 This amendment was entitled
the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984.121
Within this Act was contained section 1113,128 which stipulates that
before a court can approve rejection of a collective bargaining
129
agreement, compliance with specific procedures must occur.
These specific procedures took the form of a two-step process,
occurring in the period between the filing of the petition and the
application to reject the collective bargaining agreement.1 30 The first
step in this process helps to open communication between manage-

of action against such property under section 362 of this title, from the use,
sale, or lease of such property under section 363 of this title, or from the

granting of a lien under section 364(d) of this title, then such creditor's claim
under such subsection, shall have priority over every other claim allowable
under such subsection.
124. White, supra note 112, at 1188.
125. Id.
126. Bildisco was decided in February of 1984. Within two hours of the
Bildisco decision, H.R. 4908, Cong., Sess. (19) a predecessor of the amendment

which was eventually passed, was introduced in Congress. Note, supra note 111, at
360. The amendment was officially passed in July of 1984. Id. at 361.
127. PUB. L. No. 98-353, 98 STAT. 333 (1984).
128.

11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). This provision is too lengthy

to enumerate in its entirety. Specific sections will be enumerated where relevant.
129. This Act was primarily intended to eliminate a jurisdictional problem
which arose in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458
U.S. 50 (1982). Section 1113, providing the pre-rejection procedure, was contained

in a rider to the Act. Note, Bildisco: Are Some CreditorsMore Equal Than Others?
35 S.C.L. REv. 573 (1984).
130.

11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1). (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See infra, note 131.
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ment and labor."' Under this first step, the debtor must formulate
a proposal detailing those modifications deemed essential to a successful reorganization. 3 2 This proposal must be based upon the most
accurate and complete information available.' 33 The debtor is required
to present this proposal to the employees' authorized representative
who is entitled to receive any additional information needed to assess
the proposal. 3 4 Finally, step one imposes upon the debtor a good
faith duty to meet and to negotiate with labor so that modifications
will be satisfactory to both parties.'
Step two 13 6 invokes a tri-partite inquiry: 1) the first step must have
been complied with; 2) the employees' authorized representative must
have declined the proposal for no acceptable reason; and 3) the
equities must balance in favor of rejection. 3 7 The aim of this entire

131. The details of this first step are found at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1113(b)(1) and
(b)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985):
(b)(l) Subsequent to filing a petition and prior to filing an application seeking
rejection of a collective bargaining agreement, the debtor in possession or
trustee (hereinafter in this section "trustee" shall include a debtor in possession), shall(A) make a proposal to the authorized representative of the employees
covered by such agreement, based on the most complete and reliable
information available at the time of such proposal, which provides for
those necessary modifications in the employees benefits and protections
that are necessary to permit the reorganization of the debtor and assures
that all creditors, the debtor and all of the affected parties are treated
fairly and equitably; and
(B) provide, subject to subsection (d)(3), the representative of the employees with such relevant information as is necessary to evaluate the
proposal.
(2) During the period beginning on the date of the making of a proposal
provided for in paragraph (1) and ending on the date of the hearing provided
for in subsection (d)(1), the trustee shall meet, at reasonable times, with the
authorized representative to confer in good faith in attempting to reach
mutually satisfactory modifications of such agreement.
132. § 1113(b)(l)(A). See supra note 131.

133.
134.

Id.
§ 1113(b)(2). See supra note 131.

135. Ehrenwerth and Lally-Green, supra note 1, at 951.
136. The details of the second step are found at 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c) (1982 &
Supp. III 1985):
(c) The court shall approve an application for rejection of a collective bargaining agreement only if the court finds that(1) the trustee has, prior to the hearing, made a proposal that fulfills
the requirements of subsection (b)(1);
(2) the authorized representative of the employees has refused to accept
such proposal without good cause; and
(3) the balance of the equities clearly favors rejection of such agreement.
137. Ehrenwerth and Lally-Green, supra note 1, at 951-52.
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two-step process is to attempt to save both the collective bargaining
agreement and the business. 13 8
V.

CURRENT TRENDS IN THE POST-BrLDISCo ERA: THE WHEELINGPITTSBURGH DECISION

Section 1113's new two-step approach came to the forefront in the
case of Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corporation v. United Steelworkers.13 9 This case originated when the Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corporation embarked upon a period of heavy borrowing which combined
with a string of losses to impair the corporation's finances. 14 As a
result, Wheeling-Pittsburgh three times asked for, and received, concessions from its employees' union. 141 A fourth such request followed
and was this time greeted with the union's demand that the corporation's lenders make similar concessions. 142 Negotiations then commenced to develop a plan of concessions favorable to both labor and
143
the corporation's lenders, as well as to Wheeling-Pittsburgh itself.
When an agreement could not be reached, Wheeling-Pittsburgh responded by filing a Chapter 11 petition followed by a proposal to
the union for modification of the collective bargaining agreement. 144
To assist in the decision of whether to accept or reject the modifications, the union hired outside financial advisors. 45 These advisors
sought further financial information from Wheeling-Pittsburgh and
were denied their request. 146 Wheeling-Pittsburgh then announced its
refusal to provide any further information and its demand that the
union respond within a few days. 14 7 When the union replied that it
could make no decision without the remainder of the requested
information, Wheeling-Pittsburgh turned to the Bankruptcy Court
for relief 48 and was granted authority to reject the collective bar-

138. Id. at 950.
139. 791 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir. 1986).
140. Id. at 1076. From 1979 to 1984, the amount of Wheeling-Pittsburgh's
long-term debt rose from $170 Million to $527 million. The goal of these loans was
to create a major capital investing campaign which would make Wheeling-Pittsburgh
"one of the most modern and efficient" steel producers in the United States. Id.
141. Id. at 1076-77.
142. Id. at 1077. Up to this point, the lenders had made no concessions. Id.
143.

Id.

144. Id. Wheeling-Pittsburgh filed the bankruptcy petition on April 16, 1985.
145. Id. at 1078.
146. Id.
147. Id. On May 24, Wheeling-Pittsburgh demanded that the union respond
by May 30. Id.
148.

Id.

442
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gaining agreement. 49 The union retaliated by striking, and subsequently appealed to the District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania which affirmed the rejection. 5 0 An appeal to the Third
5
Circuit Court of Appeals followed.1 '
Two months subsequent to the filing of appeal, a settlement was
reached ending the union's strike. 5 2 Despite this settlement, the
pending appeal proceeded following a determination that the controversy had not become moot.'53 Three issues were presented on appeal
to the Third Circuit: "Whether Consideration of the Proposal Can
be Pretermitted"; 5 4 "Whether the Proposed Modifications Were
'Necessary' and Treated All Parties 'Fairly and Equitably"'; 155
56
"Whether the Procedural Test of Section 1113 Was Satisfied."1
On the first issue, dealing with whether the consideration of a
proposal may be foregone, the Third Circuit answered in the negative. 5 7 The court reasoned that in evaluating a debtor's application
for rejection, the necessity of requested modifications must be determined. 5 8 Section 1113, the court continued, requires such determinations to be made within the confines of a specific proposal. 5 9
Furthermore, neither explicit nor implicit authority allowing consideration of the debtor's proposal to be pretermitted, could be found
in section 1113.1 60
The second issue with which the Third Circuit dealt was whether
two specific requirements of section 1113 were met. The first of these
requirements mandates consideration of the necessity of proposed
modifications.' 6' To begin this analysis, the court turned to the
relevant legislative history to determine what is considered "neces-

149. Id. No citation for the bankruptcy court proceeding is available.
150. In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corporation, 52 B.R. 997 (W.D. Pa.
1985).
151. 791 F.2d at 1078.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1079-80. The Third Circuit deemed the controversy not moot,
because the negotiations which settled the strike had resulted in no agreement as to
claims of plant guards, totalling $146,000. The outcome of this appeal would
therefore be determinative as to this matter. Id.
154. Id. at 1084.
155. Id. at 1086.
156. Id. at 1093.
157. Id. at 1085.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1086. These requirements are set forth at 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(l)(A)
(1982 & Supp. III 1985). See supra note 131 for the full provision.
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sary" under the statute. 62 An examination of the legislative history
6
revealed that a desire to lower costs is not equated with necessity. 1
Nor does equitability to creditors and other such parties create
necessity.' 64 Furthermore, a debtor in possession's cash position can
be a relevant, though not exclusive factor in determining the necessity
65
Finally, the
of modification of a collective bargaining agreement.
legislative history indicated that the absence of a "snap back"
6 7
provision 166 must be considered.1
After enumerating all of these criteria, the Third Circuit determined
that neither the district court nor the Bankruptcy Court had applied
the appropriate standard of necessity. 68 Furthermore, the district
court had treated the Bankruptcy Court's findings of necessity as
factual findings which could be overturned only if clearly erroneous; 69 in actuality, this should have been dealt with as a mixed
question of fact and law. 70 As a result of these errors, the Third
7
Circuit announced that the case must be returned to the lower court. '
The court then shifted its analysis to consideration of the second
requirement of section 1113: whether fair and equitable treatment of
the parties had occurred. After first determining that the absence of
a "snap back" provision 172 was relevant to this consideration, 71 the
court went on to determine that "wage stability" for employees was
an insufficient substitute for a snap back provision. 74 Furthermore,
a plan of concessions must be evaluated from a "realistic standpoint," based upon "record evidence.' 1 75 The Third Circuit con162.

Section 11 13(b)(l)(A) itself contains no language defining "necessary".

Furthermore, committee reports were of no assistance since none existed. Hence,
the legislative history was resorted to 791 F.2d at 1087.

163. Id. at 1088.
164. Id. at 1089. The rationale here was that to hold otherwise would be to
contravene Congress' intent "to replace the Bildisco standard with one that was
more sensitive to the national policy favoring collective bargaining agreements." Id.

165. Id.
166. The Court defines a "snap back" provision as "a provision which would
increase employees' wages or benefits in the event the Company performed more
favorably than anticipated." Id. at 1090.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1091.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See supra note 166 for a definition of this term.
173. 791 F.2d at 1091-92.
174. Id. at 1092-93.
175.

Id. at 1093. In reaching this conclusion, the Court took objection to the

predication of Wheeling-Pittsburgh's proposal as "a worst-case economic scenario."
Id.
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cluded that the lower court's failure to address and treat the absence
of a snap back provision, together with the fact that the considered
proposal was not based on realistic circumstances, flawed the lower
court's decision. 176

The third and final issue was then considered: whether section
1113 had been satisfied. 177 Here, the court determined that further
proceedings were needed to determine if Wheeling-Pittsburgh had
met the statutory requirement of providing the union with all information needed to properly assess the proposal. 178 Ultimately, the
district court's decision was vacated, and the case remanded to the
79
Bankruptcy Court for the appropriate proceedings.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The addition of section 1113 to the Bankruptcy Code places a
more stringent set of checks and balances on an employer seeking
to reject a collective bargaining agreement. Section 1113 thus helps
to protect labor from indiscriminate contract rejections. The decision
in Wheeling-Pittsburgh shows judicial willingness to enforce section
1113. However, the fact remains that rejection of a collective bargaining agreement is still accepted behavior in certain cases of bankruptcy. Labor has thus lost in the collision of the National Labor
Relations Act and the Bankruptcy Code. 8°
As a consolation to labor, it may be argued that without the
supremacy of the Bankruptcy Code and its allowance of contract
rejection, all jobs in a particular company might be eliminated during
a corporate liquidation. 8 ' But with corporate reorganization following contract rejection, at least some jobs are salvaged, albeit at lower
wage rates. Still, the adverse effects flowing from rejection of a
collective bargaining agreement for which labor has fought hard

176. Id. at 1093.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1093-94. The Court reasoned that too much emphasis may have
been placed by the lower court on the need for haste in reorganization. Id.
179. Id. at 1094. Both Francis P. Massco, Esq., Assistant to the President of
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corporation and John J. McLean, Jr., Esq., of the
Pittsburgh law firm Buchanan Ingersoll, P.C., who represented Wheeling-Pittsburgh
in this litigation, have indicated that despite the remand, further proceedings did
not occur. This was due to the settlement of the claims of the plant guards, the
only remaining issue of the case. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
180. See supra the introduction of this paper, for more on the conflict between
the policies of these two bodies of law.
181. Liquidation occurs pursuant to Chapter 7. See supra note 1.
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remain undeniable.1 2 The conclusion from all of this may very well
be that the Bildisco dilemma, the dilemma of whether a bankrupt
business should be permitted to reject a collective bargaining agreement, is a vicious circle. In the end, this dilemma may never be
resolved to the satisfaction of all involved parties.
Karen M. Sirianni

182. Decreased loyalty to a company and lower worker morale are a few such
negative consequences.

